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A CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS OF SURROGATE




The phrase "surrogate motherhood"1 may spark notions of ad-
vanced scientific procedures similar to those described in Aldous Hux-
ley's Brave New World.2 Surrogate motherhood, however, is an ancient
concept. For example, the Bible notes two occasions where surrogate
mothers provided infertile women with children.' Surrogate motherhood
* Law clerk, Fourth District Court of Appeals, West Palm Beach, Florida. B.A. 1987,
Rutgers University; J.D. 1990, Case Western Reserve University. I wish to thank Professor
Kostritsky for her helpful suggestions.
1. A "surrogate" is a person who takes the place of another. WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEIATE DICTIONARY 1165 (2d ed. 1979). A "surrogate mother" is one who bears a child for
another. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTiNGs CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1983, at 28, 28. More specifically, a surrogate mother has been defined as:
a female person at least eighteen years of age, whether married or unmarried, who
agrees to be inseminated with the semen of a natural father and who, if she should
conceive a child through such insemination, voluntarily agrees to bear the child and
to terminate in favor of the natural father and his wife her parental rights and re-
sponsibilities to the child.
Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family" A Proposed Unifonn Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1300-01 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
In this Article, the author will refer to the man who supplies the sperm as the "biological
father" or "natural father" and to the woman who bears the child as the "biological mother,"
"surrogate mother," "surrogate" or "natural mother." The woman who intends to raise the
child will be called the "rearing mother" or the "adopting mother." The biological father and
the rearing mother will be called collectively the "infertile couple" or the "adopting parents."
The surrogate mother may be either single or married. Regardless of marital status, most
surrogate mothers have previously given birth and have children of their own. Robertson,
supra, at 29. At least one commentator urges that a married woman, with children of her own,
is the best prospect for surrogate motherhood because she is familiar with the psychological
and emotional factors associated with giving birth and, thus, will be more likely to relinquish
the child at birth. Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 n.4 (1986).
2. A. HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
3. The Bible states that "Abraham's wife Sarah had borne him no children. Now she had
an Egyptian slave-girl whose name was Hagar, and she said to Abraham, 'You see that the
Lord has not allowed me to bear a child. Take my slave-girl; perhaps I shall found a family
through her.'" Genesis 16:2 (New English). Later the Bible relates the dilemma of Rachel
who had borne no children with her husband, Jacob. Id. 30:1. Rachel finally said to Jacob,
"'Here is my slave-girl Bilhah. Lie with her, so that she may bear sons to be laid upon my
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has continued through the centuries,4 and it is likely to remain a viable
alternative for infertile couples. An increasing number of infertile
couples use surrogacy because of the shortage of adoptable babies,' and
the couples' desire to have a genetically related child.6 Unfortunately,
surrogacy often negatively impacts the woman acting as the surrogate.7
This Article examines the contracts entered into by surrogate
mothers and adopting parents and suggests that these agreements should
not be enforced.' First, this Article discusses the typical contractual
clauses in surrogate parenthood agreements and explains the motivations
of both the adopting parents and surrogate mothers who enter into these
contracts. Next, the Article suggests that modem contract theories, as
exemplified by Richard Posner's theory of Law and Economics, Charles
Fried's theory of Moral Obligation, and Anthony Kronman's theory of
Distributive Justice, cannot account for the unique characteristics of sur-
rogate parenthood agreements. This is primarily because of the surro-
gate mother's physical and emotional ties to the child that develop
during pregnancy. The author concludes that surrogacy contracts are
different than other types of contracts and should not be enforced. Fi-
nally, the author suggests that if these contracts are enforced, state legis-
latures should provide a post-birth "cooling-off" period during which
the surrogate mother could reconsider whether she wants to relinquish
her parental rights.
knees, and through her I too may build up a family."' Id. 30:3. In both of these situations,
the infertile women were provided with children by a surrogate mother. Id. 16:4, 30:5.
4. Katz, supra note 1, at 2. Although the procedure for surrogate motherhood "is less
personal than in Biblical times... [the basic] objective, impregnation of a surrogate to bear a
child for the natural father and his wife rather than for herself, has not changed." Id.
5. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
6. M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 6 (1988).
7. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
8. In some states surrogate parenthood agreements are not enforceable. Arizona, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Nebraska and Utah have enacted statutes declaring surrogate parenthood
agreements void. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (1989) ("no person may enter into,
induce, arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (surrogacy
"[c]ontracts or agreements... shall be void"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West Supp.
1990) ("A contract for surrogate motherhood... shall be absolutely null and shall be void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,200(1) (1988) ("surro-
gate parenthood contract entered into shall be void and unenforceable"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-204(1)(a) (1990) ("No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be a party to a
contract for profit or gain in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other
procedures and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child born as a result.").
Further consideration of whether surrogate parenthood agreements are enforceable under
existing law is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article focuses solely on whether surro-
gate parenthood agreements should be enforceable.
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II. TYPICAL SURROGATE PARENTHOOD AGREEMENTS
A. Terms Frequently Included in the Agreement
Surrogate parenthood agreements usually define the rights and du-
ties of the adoptive parents and the surrogate mother.9 These contracts
typically provide that the surrogate mother will be artificially insemi-
nated,10 carry the resulting fetus to term, and then relinquish her paren-
tal rights to the adopting parents.I I Many such contracts also require the
surrogate to undergo physical and psychological testing before the artifi-
cial insemination takes place.2 Furthermore, contracts may require the
surrogate to refrain from the use of alcohol, drugs or tobacco during
pregnancy." In addition, some contracts may require an amniocentesis
test; 4 if this reveals some defect in the pregnancy, the natural father and
adopting mother may have the contractual right to demand an abor-
tion. I" Many contracts forbid the surrogate mother from aborting the
fetus unless necessary for the surrogate's physical well-being. 6 Finally,
some surrogate contracts may require paternity testing after the child is
born. 17
9. The contracts may be long and detailed, or short and simple. See, eg., Doe v. Kelley,
106 Mich. App. 169, 172, 307 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1981) (simple surrogacy contract); In re Baby
M, 109 N.J. 396, 470-78, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-73 (1988) (detailed surrogacy contract).
10. Artificial insemination is the insertion of semen into the vagina or uterus by mechani-
cal or instrumental means other than by sexual intercourse. MOSBY'S MEDICAL & NURSING
DICTIONARY 92 (2d ed. 1986). Recently, surrogacy contracts have also arisen where the sur-
rogate mother is instead implanted with the fertilized egg of the adoptive parents. See
Mydans, Surrogate Denied Custody of Child, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22 1990, at A14, col. 1. In
these circumstances, the surrogate mother is not the "biological mother" in a genetic sense.
The case, therefore, for disallowing surrogacy contracts is less compelling, and is beyond the
scope of this Article.
11. M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 6; Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of
Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 291, 291-92 (1982); Note, Surrogate Parenthood-An Anal-
ysis of the Problems and a Solution: Representation for the Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv.
143, 164 (1985).
12. Kimbrell, The Case Against the Commercialization of Childbearing, 24 WILLAMETrE
L. REv. 1035, 1040 (1988). But see Note, supra note 11, at 164.
13. Kimbrell, supra note 12, at 1040-41; Note, supra note 1, at 1306; Note, supra note 11,
at 165.
14. Amniocentesis is the "transabdominal puncture of the amniotic sac, using a needle and
syringe, in order to remove amniotic fluid. The material obtained may be studied chemically
or cytologically to detect genetic and biochemical disorders or maternal-fetal blood incompati-
bility." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY A-71 (15th ed. 1985).
15. Kimbrell, supra note 12, at 1040-41; Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate
Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb"for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539, 544 (1983).
16. Comment, supra note 15, at 544; Note, supra note 11, at 164. But see Note, Rumpel-
stiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1936
(1986) (courts should hold specific performance not to abort unconstitutional).
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 544.
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In exchange for these services, the adoptive parents agree to pay all
medical and health-related expenses associated with the surrogate's preg-
nancy.18 Contracts may also provide that the adoptive parents pay for
the living expenses of the surrogate during the period of pregnancy.19
Furthermore, the adoptive parents may often pay traveling expenses and
insurance premiums connected with the pregnancy.20 Contracts usually
indicate the amount and payment terms of the fee paid to the surrogate
in consideration for her services.21
B. The Need for Surrogate Mothers
1. Motivations of the adoptive parents
Recently, the use of surrogate motherhood has increased.22 In most
instances, adoptive parents pursue surrogate motherhood because the
adopting mother is infertile.23 One commentator has estimated that one
out of six American couples faces infertility problems.24 This problem is
largely attributable to the availability of more effective birth control,
which allows couples to postpone the decision to have children until the
couples' less fertile years.25
Moreover, today's infertile couples face what has been coined "the
adoption famine."26 In the past, infertile parents could adopt a child
18. Katz, supra note 1, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Comment, supra note 15, at 544.
21. Katz, supra note 1, at 3 n.7 ("Fees paid to a surrogate can range from $5,000 up to
$25,000."); Note, supra note 11, at 164. One commentator notes that "[i]n return for their
servitude, mothers who sign surrogacy agreements generally are paid $10,000. Usually, this
payment is made only after the product, a healthy baby, is delivered to the customer." Kim-
brell, supra note 12, at 1036; accord Katz, supra note 1, at 21 ("mhe common mode of pay-
ment to a surrogate mother is by escrow account."). Some contracts, however, specify that no
compensation is to be paid. M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 19.
22. M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 5 (100 children born of surrogate contracts between 1976
and 1981, and 500 between 1981 and 1986); Smith, Third-Party Motherhood, L.A. Times, Sept.
25, 1990, at El, col. 5 (San Diego County ed.).
23. M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 5. Other reasons why couples pursue surrogate mother-
hood include: (1) the adoptive mother may have a genetic defect that runs in her family that
she does not want to pass on to her child, see Katz, supra note 1, at 3; (2) pregnancy may pose
medical problems, id.; (3) the adopting parents merely wish to avoid the inconvenience of
pregnancy, id.; or (4) the adopting parents' desire to have a genetically related child. M.
FIELD, supra note 6, at 6.
24. Comment, supra note 15, at 540; Note, supra note 11, at 145.
25. Harding, The Debate on Surrogate Motherhood: The Current Situation, Some Argu-
ments and Issues; Questions Facing Law and Policy, 1987 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 37, 41;
Kopytoff, Surrogate Motherhood: Questions of Law and Value, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 211-12
(1988).
26. Harding, supra note 25, at 42.
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with relative ease.27 Today, however, there is a scarcity of children "suit-
able" for adoption.28 In 1984, two million couples contended for the
58,000 children placed for adoption-this was a thirty-five to one ratio.29
Even if an infertile couple is able to adopt a child, they must wait an
average of seven years.30 In contrast, infertile couples who contract with
surrogate mothers need only wait the gestation period.31
2. Motivations of the surrogate mother
Scientists have completed very little research concerning a woman's
motivation for becoming a surrogate mother. One study, however, un-
covers three motivating factors.32 One factor is the enjoyment of preg-
nancy.33 A majority of the prospective surrogate mothers questioned
indicated that they were more content, felt more attractive or feminine
and enjoyed the extra attention given to them while they were preg-
nant.34 Some members of this study commented that pregnancy was
"'the best time of my life'-so much so that they wanted to be pregnant
the rest of their lives.
' 35
This study also found that surrogates believed that the advantages of
relinquishing the child born in a surrogacy context outweighed any dis-
advantages. 36 The researchers found that the "advantages" included: (1)
the surrogates' strong desire to give a child to a couple who could not
have children themselves; 37 and (2) the feeling "that surrogate mother-
27. IM at 41-43.
28. Id. at 42-43. As one commentator remarked, "The excess of adoptive applicants for
desirable infants is well-known.... While there is an abundance of older, handicapped, or
minority children waiting for adoption, healthy white infants are in scarce supply." Katz,
supra note 1, at 4 n.12. This scarcity of adoptable children is usually attributed to three fac-
tors: (1) the decisions of a larger number of unmarried mothers to keep their children; (2) the
greater availability of abortion; and (3) the wide-spread use of birth control. Harding, supra
note 25, at 42-43.
29. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 332, 525 A.2d 1128, 1137 (1987), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.3d 1227 (1988).
30. Note, supra note 11, at 146.
31. Katz, supra note 1, at 4.
32. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140:1 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
117 (1983).
33. I1d at 118.
34. Id. Other subjects of the study felt more complete, adequate, special, and often felt an
inner glow when they were pregnant. Id.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Franks, Psychiatric Evaluation of Women in a Surrogate Mother Program, 138:10 AM.
J. PsYCHIATRY 1378, 1379 (1981); Parker, supra note 32, at 118. Dr. Franks comments that
"[a]ll [prospective surrogate mothers] gave similar reasons for entering this program ....
[Among these reasons were the ] love for their own children, [and] the desire to share this love
and pleasure with others who had not been able to conceive their own child." Franks, supra,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:395
hood would help them master unresolved feelings they had regarding a
previous voluntary loss of fetus or baby through abortion or relinquish-
ment."' 38 In fact, more than one-third of the surrogate mothers inter-
viewed previously had undergone a voluntary abortion or had given a
child up for adoption.39
Finally, researchers have found that many surrogate mothers are
also motivated by economics. The vast majority of prospective surrogate
mothers surveyed indicated that they would not participate in a surro-
gate parenthood arrangement unless they were paid a fee.' Payment of
a fee, however, was not the only reason for a woman to want to be a
surrogate mother.41
III. THREE CONTRACT THEORIES AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
This section attempts to place surrogate motherhood contracts
within three modem contract law theories.42 Although a surrogate
at 1379. For example, Mary Beth Whitehead testified that "she wanted to give another couple
the 'gift of life.'" In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 413, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (1988). Another
surrogate similarly stated that: "'I'm not going to cure cancer or become Mother Theresa, but
a baby is one thing I can sort of give back, something I can give to someone who couldn't have
it any other way.'" Kantrowitz, Who Keeps Baby M, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 44, 47
(quoting Lisa Walters, a thirty-two year old housewife and mother of two).
38. Parker, supra note 32, at 118; Goleman, Motivations of Surrogate Mothers, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at Cl, col. 4 ("Surrogate mothers may have guilt over a past abortion.").
39. Of this latter group, the number of women who had had an abortion outnumbered
those who had relinquished a child for adoption by more then two to one. Parker, supra note
32, at 118.
40. Franks, supra note 37, at 1379; Parker, supra note 32, at 117 ("Of 122 women, 108
(89%) said that they required a fee for their participation: most required at least $5,000.").
41. Franks, supra note 37, at 1379; Parker, supra note 32, at 118. Dr. Franks claims that
the motivation of surrogates "seem[s] to be an interesting mixture of financial and altruistic
factors." Franks, supra note 37, at 1379. Although the surrogate mother in In re Baby M
was motivated to become a surrogate because of "her sympathy with family members and
others who could have no children ... she also wanted the $10,000 [surrogate fee] to help her
[own] family." Baby M, 109 N.J. at 413, 537 A.2d at 1236.
42. Unfortunately, the three contract law theories selected may not represent an adequate
conception of the current analysis of contract doctrine. One could very interestingly place
surrogate motherhood contracts in Critical Legal Studies philosophy. See Dalton, An Essay in
the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 994 (1985); Feinman, Critical Ap-
proaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829 (1983). Surrogacy agreements could also be
analyzed under the "relational" rubric. See Goetz & Scott, Pinciples of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Rela-
tions Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 854
(1978); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589
(1974); Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 545.
Consideration of these contract law theories in the context of surrogate motherhood contracts,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
At least two commentators have argued that extant contract doctrine cannot accomodate
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mother's relationship with the adoptive parents is contractual, 43 an anal-
ysis of that relationship within the three contract theories reveals that
surrogate motherhood contracts are unique. This is because surrogate
mothers develop a special bond with their child during pregnancy-a
bond which surrogate mothers are unable to consider adequately when
signing the surrogacy contract.' As a result, this section concludes that
surrogacy contracts should not be enforced against the surrogate mother.
Rather, the surrogate mother should be permitted to reconsider her deci-
sion in light of the "bonding" element after the birth of the child. Then,
at that time, the surrogate mother should be permitted to either reaffirm
or revoke the surrogacy contract.
A. Contract Law in Terms of Economic Theory
1. Posner's theory of law and economics
According to Richard Posner,45 economics is the science of rational
choice in a world of limited resources.46 As such, it can be a powerful
tool for analyzing a vast range of legal questions from common law prop-
surrogate motherhood contracts. One commentator believes that "[s]urrogacy contracts call
for new doctrine; current doctrine cannot accomodate a mother who changes her mind."
Barnes, Delusion by Analysis: The Surrogate Mother Problem, 34 S.D.L. REv. 1, 15 (1989).
Another commentator examines surrogate motherhood contracts in light of the historical
distinction between commercial contracts and domestic agreements. Carbone, The Role of
Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy Contracts, 28 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 581 (1988). Carbone argues that contract doctrine is more appropriate for governing
agreements that are concerned primarily with the interests of the contracting parties and in
which the parties to the agreements have equal bargaining power. Id. at 583, 586. Carbone
believes that these requirements are satisfied in surrogate motherhood contracts, and conse-
quently, contract doctrine should be applied to these contracts. Id. at 597-603. However,
Carbone recognizes that:
The fact that many people may be able to enter into a surrogate agreement on the
basis of an informed and rational decision does not mean that all volunteers are thus
capable. Some women may be psychologically unable to make a realistic commit-
ment to surrender a child in advance. Those who have not experienced childbirth
may underestimate the changes that occur during pregnancy, such that their decision
is, in fact, less than wholly informed.
Id. at 598 n.56.
Carbone mistakenly believes that this particular problem may be avoided by requiring
surrogate mothers to undergo psychological screening and counseling and to have experienced
previous pregnancies. See id. This is not always the case. For example, the surrogate mother
in In re Baby M met the above conditions, yet was psychologically unable to make a realistic
commitment to surrender a child in advance. 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988).
43. M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 5.
44. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
45. Richard Posner is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
46. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (1986).
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erty rights to free speech.47 So important is economic analysis in legal
reasoning, Posner argues, that many judicial opinions of the great com-
mon law areas "bear the stamp of economic reasoning." 4
Posner's theory begins with the assumption that people are "rational
maximizers" of their self-interest.49 If this is true, people will alter their
behavior in ways that will increase their own satisfaction.50 Posner be-
lieves three fundamental principles of economics derive from this
proposition.51
The first is the Law of Demand which recognizes the inverse rela-
tion between the price charged and the quantity demanded for a good or
service." When prices increase, a person will investigate the possibility
of substituting less expensive, and perhaps less desirable, goods for the
more expensive ones. 3 An increase in prices has two effects: (1) substi-
tutes become more attractive; and (2) consumer wealth is reduced-the
same income buys fewer goods.54 Therefore, as the price of a good or
service rises, demand for it falls.
The second principle is that consumers will maximize their utility,55
and sellers will maximize their profits. 6 A central concept to this princi-
ple is the idea of "opportunity cost"-by using a resource in one way, a
person is denying the use of that resource to someone else.5 7 This alter-
nate value is not necessarily pecuniary.58
The third principle is that resources tend to gravitate to the most
valuable uses in a system of voluntary exchange.5 9 For example, if the
owner of a good [0], prices the good's total pecuniary and non-pecuniary
value at x dollars and if someone else offers [0] x plus one dollar for the
same good, [0] will sell it to that person. In other words, resources will
be employed efficiently by employing their highest value uses.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 21. Posner specifically mentions property, tort, crimes and contracts, but insists
this list is not exhaustive. Id.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 4-11.
52. Id. at 4-5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. According to Posner, utility has two meanings: (1) the value of an expected cost or
benefit; or (2) the value in the sense of happiness. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. Id. Posner points out that economics is not about money. Housework is considered
an economic activity, even if the homemaker is not paid. Id. at 6-7.
59. Id. at 9-10.
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These three principles assume that transactions are voluntary.' A
problem with this assumption, however, is that a truly voluntary transac-
tion is one which has no potential losers. Very few transactions satisfy
this requirement.6' The alternative approach is to "guess" what would
have occurred had a truly voluntary transaction been possible.62 From
this it may be determined, to some extent, whether or not the transaction
was efficient.63
Efficiency is an important concept in contract analysis for several
reasons. Most importantly, efficiency maximizes wealth, and wealth
makes possible the major ingredients of people's happiness. 64 Another
reason is that efficiency is a secondary meaning ofjustice.65 In a world of
scarce resources, waste should be regarded as immoral.66 However, Pos-
ner himself admits that efficiency is not the only value that may be con-
sidered in legal analysis and that there is more to justice than just
economics.67
2. Criticisms of Posner's theory as applied to surrogate motherhood
agreements
Posner has applied his economic theories to surrogate mother con-
tracts and has concluded that such contracts should be enforceable. 6
Posner cites three key factors in the popularity of surrogate contracts:
(1) infertile couples are not prone to resign themselves to infertility be-
cause of scientific advances in the field of reproduction; (2) the decline in
conventional attitudes toward sex and family; and (3) the shortage of
healthy, white babies for adoption.6 9
According to Posner's economic theory, parties would not enter into
a contract unless they believed it to be mutually beneficial.7" This princi-
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. It is often impossible to foresee all potential losers from a transaction. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 14-15. Posner also notes that it is not only monetary wealth of which he is
speaking. He notes that leisure, medicine and even philosophy are made possible by wealth.
Id.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 26.
68. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood, 5 1. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 21, 22 (1989).
69. Id. Posner argues that even if a shortage of healthy, white babies did not exist, a
demand for surrogate contracts would continue because couples desire a genetic link to the
child. Id.
70. R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 5.
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ple holds true in surrogate parenthood contracts.71 Mutual benefits can-
not be realized, however, unless the contracts are enforced.
72  If
surrogate motherhood contracts are not enforced, the arrangement be-
comes less attractive to the adopting parents because of the possibility of
their disappointment.73
Additionally, if surrogacy contracts are not enforced, Posner be-
lieves surrogacy becomes less valuable to the surrogate mother because
she loses part of her bargaining power.74 If surrogacy contracts are en-
forced, the surrogate could command a much higher fee from the adop-
tive parents because the result is certain.75
Posner's analysis, however, is flawed. 76 Although Posner attempts
to rebut criticisms of his application of economic theory to surrogate
motherhood contracts, three of these rebuttals are unpersuasive. First,
Posner concludes that no evidence exists to support the common belief
that surrogate mothers underestimate the distress of giving up a child.7 7
Posner reasons that just because surrogate mothers in a few highly publi-
cized cases may have underestimated this distress, there is no reason to
make a generalization for all surrogate mothers.78 Contrary to Posner's
assertion, however, the relatively little amount of litigation concerning
the custody of babies born of surrogacy arrangements does not necessar-
ily indicate that most "surrogate mothers do not balk when it comes time
to surrender [the] baby."'79  Evidence concerning how a birth mother
feels in giving up her child indicates that many natural mothers who
71. Posner, supra note 68, at 22. A father and his wife expect to derive a benefit from the
baby which is greater than the contract price. Id. Additionally, the surrogate expects to de-
rive a benefit from the contract price which is greater than the pecuniary and nonpecuniary
costs of being pregnant, giving birth and surrendering the baby. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Additionally, Posner notes that the adoptive parents also spend considerable time
searching for the appropriate surrogate mother arrangement. Id.
74. Id. If surrogate contracts are enforceable, the surrogate mother could still bargain for
an option to rescind, but such an option would lower the value of her surrogacy services. Id.
By declaring all surrogacy contracts unenforceable, the surrogate mother loses the option to
rescind, and she, therefore, has no freedom of choice. Id.
75. Id.
76. A basic attack on Posner's analysis is that legal economics does not adequately ac-
count for the noneconomic consequences resulting from enforcement of a contract against a
surrogate mother who has bonded with her fetus. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract
Law, 67 TEx. L. REv. 103, 122 (1988). For example, it may be impossible to quantify a
surrogate mother's loss of self-respect and personal integrity when she relinquishes her child.
See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
77. Posner, supra note 68, at 22.




relinquish their babies at birth are affected negatively.80 Therefore, it is
mistaken to conclude that the average surrogate mother would not un-
derestimate the way she may feel at giving up her child. A surrogate
mother's desire to enter a surrogacy contract for emotional reasons may
cloud her ability to estimate the way she may feel in giving up the baby at
birth.8'
Posner's second flaw is in his rationalization that most surrogate
mothers are mature women with children, and therefore, are able to
make an informed decision."2 The "maturity" of a woman, however, is
not likely to make a surrogate's decision fully informed. Regardless of
the awareness raised by the publicity surrounding surrogacy cases, such
as the Baby M case, 3 the trauma resulting from the birth mother bond-
ing with the baby and then relinquishing the child can only be appreci-
ated by a woman who has experienced this situation. Surely, an
individual blind from birth cannot truly appreciate what it is like to see.
Likewise, a birth mother cannot appreciate what it is like to give up "her
child" until she has been in that situation. Thus, publicity of this poten-
tial harm does not make future surrogate mothers fully informed.
The third flaw in Posner's reasoning is his overstated assertion that
if surrogate mothers were allowed to rescind their contracts, the entire
world of contracting would be undermined.84 What Posner fails to con-
sider is that surrogacy contracts are different from other contracts. Al-
lowing natural mothers to rescind the surrogacy contracts will not
undermine the entire world of contracting. Surrogate mothers represent
a unique class of individuals deserving special protection because surro-
gate mothers may not comprehend the full ramifications of their prom-
ise.8" Therefore, surrogacy agreements should be rescindable
B. Contract as a Promise
A second theory of modem contract law which fails to furnish an
adequate analytical model for analyzing the unique nature of surrogate
80. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
82. Posner, supra note 68, at 25.
83. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), ajJ'd in part and rev'd in
part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
84. Posner, supra note 68, at 30. Posner reasons that if the law considers a surrogate's
assent to a surrogacy contract uninformed, "the whole enterprise of contracting is placed
under a cloud." Id.
85. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
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parent agreements is that advanced by Charles Fried.86
1. Fried's theory of "moral obligation"
Fried's "Moral Obligation" theory of contract law rests upon the
"promise principle" which itself is supported by three pillars: trust, com-
mitment and individual autonomy. Fried contends that these pillars suf-
fuse each promise with moral obligation thereby rendering all promises
irrevocable.
a. the promise principle
In essence, through the "promise principle," individuals "impose on
themselves obligations where none existed before." 87 Fried contends that
the promise principle serves as the moral basis of contract law.88 The
promise principle reflects a societal recognition that individuals have ba-
sic rights with respect to their persons and their labor, and that individu-
als can freely "dispos[e] of these rights on terms that seem best to
[them]."
8 9
There are three basic elements which comprise Fried's promise prin-
ciple-trust, commitment and individual autonomy. According to
Fried, a promise confers upon the promisee a moral power to consum-
mate a transaction with the expectation of promised help from the prom-
isor 90 The promises of the contracting parties are based on trust, which
"becomes a powerful tool for our working our mutual wills in the
world." 91 Therefore, Fried concludes that, "By promising, we transform
a choice that was morally neutral into one that is morally compelled."92
86. Charles Fried is a Professor at Harvard Law School. Professor Fried served as Solici-
tor General under President Reagan from 1985 to 1989.
87. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1
(1981).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
[C]itizens in the liberal democracies have become increasingly free to dispose of their
talents, labor, and property as seems best to them. The freedom to bind oneself con-
tractually to a future disposition is an important and striking example of this freedom
... because in a promise one is taking responsibility not only for one's present self
but for one's future self.
Id. at 21.
90. Id. at 8. When people can freely serve each other's purposes through promises, it is
trust which allows them to have confidence that the other "will do what is right." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Fried compares reporting present intentions to making a promise. "Promising is
more than just truthfully reporting.., present intentions, for [as to present intentions] I may
be free to change my mind, [but] I am not free to break my promise." Id. at 9 (emphasis
added). Fried distinguishes a broken promise from a lie, even though both abuse trust. Id.
When a person lies, the wrong is committed at the time of utterance. Id. On the other hand, a
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The second element of Fried's promise principle is commitment.
According to Fried, "[a] promise invokes trust in... future actions, not
merely in... present sincerity."93 In order to animate this trust, com-
mitment is required: the promisor must be committed to more than the
truth of some statement.94 Fried suggests that commitment prevents a
change of heart by the promisor because a commitment "make[s] non-
optional a course of conduct that would otherwise be optional .... ..9
The irrevocable, non-optional nature of the commitment reflects the reci-
procity of gain between the promisor and the promisee as to the terms of
the promise.
9 6
The third element of Fried's promise principle is individual auton-
omy.97 "[M]utual respect allows men and women to accomplish what in
a jungle of unrestrained self-interest could not be accomplished." 98 Fried
concludes that recognition of the opportunity to accomplish things by
promise is not grounded merely in a societal convention of upholding
promises, but rather, is grounded in the individual's moral obligation to
keep the promise.99 For Fried, promising is "a device that free, moral
individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which
gathers its moral force from that premise. ' ' 10°
Fried suggests that promises cannot be broken because the elements
of trust, commitment and individual autonomy which comprise the
promise, act symbiotically to create a moral obligation from which indi-
promise puts a moral charge on a future or potential act, and therefore, the wrong is commit-
ted later. Id
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. For Fried, the simple communication of an intent to do some future act is not
enough to bind the parties morally. Id. at 10. The prdmisor could have an honest change of
heart. Id. Additionally, a stated intent (or promise) cannot be enforced simply because the
promisee relied on it. Id. A promisee could then "pick and choose" from the promisor's
statements or conduct on which to rely. Id. at 10-11. The promisor's commitment morally
binds the promisor to the statement. Id. at 12-13.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. Fried suggests people do not make commitments for purely altruistic motives, but
because of a need for cooperation. Id.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id.
100. Id. As a subcomponent to Fried's concept of "individual autonomy," Fried explains
that, unless a promisor cannot change his or her mind, the promisor cannot be taken seriously.
Id. "[Holding people to their obligations is a way of taking them seriously and thus giving the
concept of sincerity itself serious content." Id. at 20. However, Fried also argues that "re-
spect for others as free and rational requires taking seriously their capacity to determine their
own values." Id. A surrogate mother's refusal to terminate her parental rights is a value
decision that deserves respect. Consequently, a surrogate mother cannot be taken seriously
unless she is allowed to change her mind. The contradiction should be resolved in favor of the
surrogate mother.
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vidual promisor cannot retreat. 10 1
2. Criticisms of Fried's theory as applied to surrogate motherhood
agreements
The essence of Fried's theory is that a promisor cannot renege on a
promise because of an underlying moral obligation to keep the promise
and to not change one's mind as the time for performance draws near.
Applying this theory to the surrogate mother context, the surrogate
mother would be irrevocably bound by her promise to deliver the child to
the adopting parents after bearing it.10 2 The consequences of this irrevo-
cable promise create serious problems for surrogate mothers who freely
enter into a surrogacy agreement before insemination and later change
their minds.
Fried's theory of contract forecloses the possibility that the surro-
gate mother can change her mind. This unalterable premise fails to con-
sider the possibility that a surrogate mother having given birth may be a
wholly different promisor than she was when she entered the agreement.
Therefore, perhaps she ought to be able to change her mind and be re-
leased from the obligation to deliver the child to the biological father and
his wife.
At least one study reveals that most mothers form a strong emo-
tional attachment to the fetus during pregnancy.10 3 This "emotional
bond with the fetus develops surprisingly soon after conception and for
most women deepens considerably during pregnancy, so that as delivery
approaches, feelings of identity with the fetus and a new readiness and
eagerness to relate to the actual baby have been established." 104 By the
101. Id. at 14-15.
102. Fried maintains that a promise represents the ability to freely dispose of rights with
respect to property and labor. Id. at 2. The surrogate mother situation fits this definition.
With respect to a "free" disposition of rights there are three reasons why the surrogate parent-
ing agreement is entered into freely by the surrogate mother. First, when the agreement is
made, the intended surrogate is not suffering from financial pressure to "give up a child"
because the proposed surrogate has not even been inseminated yet. Katz, supra note 1, at 21.
Second, because the surrogate is not yet inseminated the stresses associated with an unwanted
pregnancy are not present. Id. at 21; Comment, supra note 15, at 549; Comment, Surrogate
Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV.
467, 478 (1982). Third, a surrogate is often represented by her own independent counsel, who
will strive to promote her best interests. Katz, supra note 1, at 21.
103. See M. LIEFER, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF MOTHERHOOD: A STUDY OF FIRST
PREGNANCY 71 (1980). A maternal bond is an "attachment... [in which] an enduring affec-
tional bond and commitment to a child develops." Mercer, Feretich, May, DeJoseph & Sollid,
Further Exploration of Maternal and Paternal Fetal Attachment, 11 RES. NURSING & HEALTH
83, 84 (1988) [hereinafter Further Exploration].
104. M. LIEFER, supra note 103, at 76.
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end of the last trimester, the mother's relationship with the fetus has
solidified. 10 5
Maternal bonding is not limited to women who become pregnant
with the intention of keeping their child. 06 One researcher who studied
twenty women who had agreed in writing to relinquish the child at birth
for adoption discovered that:
[Nineteen] of them developed a covert maternal identification
with the fetus; this identification became more manifest in the
second trimester with quickening. During this time the sub-
jects established an intense private monologue with the fetus,
including a rescue fantasy in which they and the newborn in-
fant would somehow be "saved" from the relinquishment.0 7
Another study has indicated that women who have relinquished a
child for adoption have continued to feel a "bond of such enduring inten-
sity that time and physical separation often do not seem to weaken the
affinity of the mother for the child."' 0
Just as in the adoption scenario, fetal bonding occurs with surrogate
mothers. 09 Thus, Fried's "Moral Obligation" theory of contract fails to
appreciate the significance of the surrogate mother's changed position.1 0
Fried's basic premise is that the "individual" is morally obligated to ir-
105. Id. at 79.
106. Rynearson, Relinquishment and Its Maternal Complications: A Preliminary Study,
139:3 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 338 (1982).
107. Id. at 339.
108. Miller & Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55(3)
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 411, 412 (1985).
109. Katz, supra note 1, at 21; Sub, Surrogate Motherhood: An Argument for Denial of
Specific Performance, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 357, 373 (1989). "Bonding evidence...
shows that the birthmother's bond to her baby at birth is stronger than that of the biological
father." Id. A recent study disclosed that "women demonstrated higher fetal attachment...
then [sic] men." Further Exploration, supra note 103, at 93.
110. Kromnan, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 780 n.59 (1983).
Kronman believes that when a person enters into a contract, he or she has certain goals that he
or she believes will be promoted, and has certain assumptions about the world. Id. Although
a mistaken assumption will often disappoint the promisor, Kronman argues that it does not in
itself undermine a person's confidence in the rationality of his or her own choices, and conse-
quently has little moral significance. Id. A mistake of this type should not excuse perform-
ance. Id
On the other hand, when a promisor's goals undergo a significant change, he or she may
believe that their decision was irrational. Id. Moreover, Kronman argues that the promisor
may feel self-betrayed, because he or she was responsible for making the promise. Id. This
feeling, according to Kromnan, will weaken a person's confidence in his or her ability to make
lasting commitments and will undermine his or her self-respect. For these reasons, when a
promisor's goals undergo a significant change, he or she should be allowed to rescind his or her
contract. Id.
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revocably uphold a promise.111 In the context of surrogate mother con-
tracts however, Fried's theory is unsupportable because the uninsemina-
ted surrogate promisor undergoes physiological and psychological exper-
iences that, in the end, render the post partum mother a different
"individual."112
Therefore, a theory of contract that provides an escape mechanism
for the promisor in a scenario where the promisor has undergone a fun-
damental change in circumstances, views and goals is necessary.
C Contract Law as Distributive Justice
1. Kronman's theory of distributive justice and paretianism
Anthony Kronman113 identifies the basic theme of the libertarian
theory of exchange-only voluntary agreements that do not infringe on
rights of third parties are enforceable. 4 He notes that in assessing the
voluntariness of an agreement the fact that the agreement was motivated
by a "deliberate decision of some sort" is not dispositive1 5 He suggests
that a true assessment of voluntariness would demand giving adequate
consideration to the circumstances under which the agreement was en-
tered. 1 6 Consequently, Kronman asserts, a contract theory should spec-
ify the circumstances under which an agreement is made voluntarily. 117
Kronman provides three examples of circumstances which make a
promisor's agreement involuntary and thus unenforceable: (1) incapacity
of the promisor;'s (2) performance of an impermissible act by the other
party;119 and (3) the other party's monopoly of some scarce resource. 120
The problem, Kronman argues, is how to identify the circumstances
111. C. FRIED, supra note 87, at 16.
112. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of maternal bonding.
113. Anthony T. Kronman is a Professor at Yale Law School.
114. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 475 (1980).
115. Id. at 478. For example, suppose a gunman stops X and says, "Your money or your
life," and X decides to relinquish his wallet. It is possible to characterize X's agreement as
voluntary for, after a rational consideration of alternatives, X decided to do precisely what the
gunman asked. Id. at 477. Kronman argues that this is not the type of voluntary action that
would or ought to give rise to binding contractual assent because "defining voluntariness in
this way conflicts with deeply entrenched notions of moral responsibility." Id. at 478.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 478-79. For example, a contract entered into by a minor is voidable. 2 S. Wa-
LISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRA=TS § 222 (1938).
119. Kronman, supra note 114, at 475-79.
120. Id. at 479. Assume that Y owned a lemonade stand in the middle of the Sahara desert.
Y refused to give X, a lost and thirsty traveler, a glass of lemonade unless X signed over his
entire estate. Kronman argues that, if X were to sign over his entire estate, the agreement
would be involuntary and thus not legally binding. See id. at 479.
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under which an agreement should be deemed involuntary.12 1 He posits
that the problem is "determining which of the many forms of advantage-
taking in exchange relationships are [involuntary and, thus,] impermissi-
ble."' 22 Kronman uses the term "advantage-taking" in a liberal sense
123
and concludes that any positive attribute one party has that the other
party lacks constitutes an advantage. 124 Advantage-taking may involve
the use of inherent traits, such as intelligence or strength, and resources,
such as information, in the contract exchange process.1 25 Kronman as-
serts that advantage-taking occurs in every contractual exchange by both
parties to the transaction, 126 but, not every exploited advantage is objec-
tionable.1 27 According to Kronman, an agreement is voluntary, and
therefore legally enforceable, if no objectionable advantage-taking takes
place. 128
Kronman argues that a principled basis is needed to distinguish per-
missible forms of advantage-taking from impermissible ones. 129 He offers
the principle of "paretianism" as the proper basis to make this distinc-
tion; one that, he argues, libertarians would adopt.130 Paretianism states
that "a particular form of advantage-taking should be allowed [only] if it
121. Id at 479-80.
122. Id at 480. Kronman reasons that:
In each of the hypothetical cases [in which the agreement was held to be involuntary]
. . the promisee enjoys an advantage of some sort which he has attempted to exploit
for his own benefit .... In each of these cases, the fundamental question is whether
the promisee should be permitted to exploit his advantage to the detriment of the
other party, or whether permitting him to do so will deprive the other party of the
freedom that is necessary, from a libertarian point of view, to make his promise truly




125. Id. ("The advantage may consist in his superior information, intellect, or judgment, in
the monopoly he enjoys with regard to a particular resource, or in his possession of a powerful
instrument of violence or a gift for deception."). Impermissible advantage-taking may consist
of, for example, a physically stronger party using his or her strength to coerce the physically
weaker party to enter into an agreement. Id. at 481. Agreements induced by impermissible
advantage-taking are involuntary and for this reason are not legally binding. Id
126. Id. at 480.
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id. at 481-83. Such a principle is needed to determine which agreements are voluntary
and consequently, which agreements are legally binding.
130. Id at 484-85. Initially, Kronman considers the "liberty principle" as a possible crite-
rion. The liberty principle holds that "advantage-taking by one party to an agreement should
be allowed unless it infringes the rights or liberty of the other party." Id at 483. Kronman
notes that the liberty principle, despite its apparent simplicity and appeal, fails to "provide a
satisfactory test for discriminating between acceptable and unacceptable forms of advantage-
taking in the exchange process." Id He reasons that the liberty principle is not useful because
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works to the long[-]run benefit of those disadvantaged by it.' 131
Kronman considers the possibility of two distinct interpretations of this
principle-one individualistic and the other class-based. 132 Noting the
near unworkability of the individualistic interpretation, 133 Kronman opts
for a class-based interpretation "requiring only that the welfare of most
people who are taken advantage of in a particular way be increased by the
kind of advantage-taking in question."'134
it does not provide information on the rights of individuals, but rather "assumes that we pos-
sess such knowledge independently of the principle itself." Id.
Kronman also considers the "doctrine of natural superiority" as a possible candidate. Id.
at 484. This principle holds that some people have inherent advantages over others as a result
of greater intelligence, beauty or nobility. Id According to this principle, if a person benefits
in her agreements from her natural attributes then these transactions categorically involve
unobjectionable advantage-taking even though it leads to non-egalitarian results. Id. However,
Kronman believes that this principle rests upon the idea of differential worthiness. Id. There-
fore, it is contrary to the libertarian conception of individual equality. Id. at 485.
Finally, Kronman considers classical utilitarianism. This principle would allow advan-
tage-taking if it would maximize the greatest amount of some desired good, such as happiness,
for the greatest number of people. Id. at 484. Kronman notes that libertarianism, in addition
to being egalitarian, "is also an individualistic theory in the sense that it assigns a unique value
to the autonomy of the individual person." Id. at 485-86. However, he rejects utilitarianism
as inconsistent with the idea of individual autonomy for its evident inability to take into ac-
count the individual's independence. Id. at 486. He concludes that paretianism, the only prin-
ciple that is neither anti-individualistic nor anti-egalitarian, is the only logical choice that
libertarians would embrace. Id
131. Id
132. Id at 486-87. The individualistic interpretation, on the assumption that paretianism is
an individualistic principle, would require us to look at the long-run effect of advantage-taking
on each individual being taken advantage of in the transaction. Id. at 486; see Alexander &
Wang, Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3 LAW & PHIL. 281, 283 (1984).
133. Kronman, supra note 114, at 486-87 (such individualistic approach would deprive
legal rules of their predictability; legislature is better equipped to evaluate effects of rules on
classes of persons).
134. Id at 487. Kronman asserts that this interpretation of the principle is easier to apply.
Id. Arguably, one could criticize his theory for not taking into account the decrease in the
welfare of the advantaged party or class which would result by not allowing the advantage-
taking in question to be exercised.
It must be noted that Kronman is attempting to construct a principle of distributive jus-
tice that would comport with libertarian philosophy. According to the libertarian philosophy,
"individuals have a moral right to make whatever voluntary agreements they wish for the
exchange of their own property, so long as the rights of third parties are not violated as a
result." Id at 475. Thus, the libertarian theory of contract law, and not Kronman, limits
paretianism's concern to the welfare of the disadvantaged party or class.
In addition, if the principle of paretianism were to take into account the well-being of the
advantaged party, then the principle's application would be indistinguishable from the utilita-
rian calculus. For a discussion of why Kronman believes that a libertarian would object to
utilitarianism as the appropriate principle for distinguishing permissible from impermissible
advantage-taking, see id. at 486-87.
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2. Criticisms of Kronman's theory as applied to surrogate
motherhood agreements
In applying Kronman's theory to surrogacy contracts, the surrogate
mother is arguably "taken advantage of" by the adoptive parents because
she is in an economic position that is inferior to that of the adoptive
parents. 135 Therefore, surrogacy contracts should be enforceable only if
the class of surrogate mothers, as a whole, is benefitted by surrogacy
contracts.
There are at least two flaws with Kronman's theory when applied to
surrogate parenthood contracts. First, Kronman's conclusion that liber-
tarians would adopt the principle of paretianism as the appropriate prin-
ciple for distinguishing permissible from impermissible advantage-taking
is false. Kronman correctly comments that libertarian philosophy is
very individualistic. 136 Specifically, Kronman states that "libertarianism
is... an individualistic theory in... that it assigns a unique value to the
autonomy of the individual person." '137 Kronman explains that "Respect
for the autonomy of persons means that individuals cannot be restricted
in their freedom solely for the purpose of increasing the overall amount
of some desired good, including freedom itself."'
138
Using the class-based interpretation of the principle of paretianism,
Kronman would conclude that surrogacy contracts work to the long-run
welfare of surrogate mothers as a class.'39 This conclusion, however, dis-
regards the welfare of certain individual surrogates who may want to
rescind the surrogacy contracts. Therefore, Kronman's interpretation of
paretianism fails to consider the welfare of individual surrogates and, as a
result, seems directly opposed to libertarian philosophy of strict
individualism."4°
A second flaw in Kronman's theory is that the principle of paretian-
ism leads to contradictory conclusions depending on how the class of
"surrogate mothers" is defined. For example, suppose that surrogate
135. In the surrogacy situation, the adoptive parents are the advantaged party and the sur-
rogate mother is the disadvantaged party because the adoptive parents are usually wealthier
than the surrogate mother. Kantrowitz, supra note 37, at 46.
136. Kronman, supra note 114, at 485.
137. Id. at 485-86.
138. Id. at 486 n.34.
139. Kronman would base this conclusion on several factors. First, the class of surrogate
mothers will likely receive a larger surrogate fee. See id at 476; see also Posner, supra note 68,
at 22 (concluding enforcability of surrogate motherhood contracts will result in larger fees to
surrogates). Second, the autonomy of the class would be increased by allowing them to enter
into enforceable contracts. See Kronman, supra note 114, at 476.
140. Kromnan, supra note 114, at 476 (class-based interpretation of paretianism principle
would substitute "the overall welfare of a group for the welfare of a particular individual").
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mothers from urban or rural areas compose forty percent of the class of
"all surrogate mothers," and the surrogates from the suburbs constitute
the remaining sixty percent of the class. Assume further that ninety-five
percent of the surrogate mothers living in the suburban areas are finan-
cially successful and are not motivated to enter into the surrogacy con-
tracts by the fee offered. Assume also that seventy-five percent of the
surrogate mothers who live in rural or urban areas are less successful
financially, and, therefore, are influenced to enter the surrogate
parenthood agreement primarily because of the surrogacy fee. If the
paretianism principle were applied to the subclass of surrogate mothers
who live in urban or rural areas, the natural father's wealth-based advan-
tage-taking would be impermissible because the majority of surrogates in
this subclass (seventy-five percent) would be economically coerced into
the surrogacy agreement. When the principle is applied to the class of
"all surrogate mothers" however, a contrary result is reached.1 41 This
dichotomy seems somewhat arbitrary.
As a result of these two flaws, Kronman's theory is unhelpful in
determining whether surrogacy contracts should be enforced. All surro-
gate mothers cannot be "lumped into" one class. Such a class definition
not only contradicts libertarian philosophy, but it fails to consider ade-
quately the individual motivations of each surrogate mother.
3. Proposed reformulations of paretianism
One possible solution is to formulate a principle of paretianism that
solely concerns the long-term welfare of the exploited individual. While
Kronman considers this possibility, he rejects it as impractical. 142 Alter-
141. Based on the hypothetical, the advantage-taking result for the class of all surrogate
mothers is illustrated as follows:
percentage of percentage of
percentage of category all surrogates
demographic categories all surrogates economically economically
of surrogates in category influenced influenced
urban/rural areas 40% 75% 30%
suburban areas 60% 5% 3%
33%
According to this illustration, only 33% of the class of all surrogate mothers is economically
coerced. Therefore, as a whole, surrogate mothers are benefitted by surrogacy contracts.
142. Kronman, supra note 114, at 486-87. Kronman believes that:
[I]t would probably be impossible for courts to make such highly individualized as-
sessments, except in rare cases, and in any event, an approach of this sort would
create uncertainty and deprive legal rules of their predictability.... Moreover, un-
like a court, a legislature must evaluate the effects of proposed rules on classes of
persons rather than on particular identifiable individuals.
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natively, paretianism may be reformulated to incorporate a narrower def-
inition for the group of people who are taken advantage of in a particular
way. A narrower definition decreases the chance of violating the auton-
omy of a particular disadvantaged individual.143 Such a formulation
would hold:
The advantage-taking by [A] is permissible if, and only if, the
welfare of the class of people [B] who occupy state of affairs
[Cn] is increased in the long run by [A] exercising his or her
advantage.
In the context of surrogacy agreements [A], the advantaged party, would
represent the wealthy adopting parent, and [B], the disadvantaged party,
would represent surrogate mothers.14
This new version of paretianism is more useful because the parame-
ters of the disadvantaged class are defined by the state of affairs [Cn].
The state of affairs [Cn] should be defined in terms of a set of relevant
circumstances and should not turn on a specific individual's mental state.
For example, impoverished surrogates may occupy state of affairs [C1],
while financially stable surrogates would occupy another, [C2]. In addi-
tion, surrogate mothers who lack a high-school education may occupy
state of affairs [C3], and those surrogates who have earned a bachelor's
degree would occupy [C4]. This formulation accounts for the fundamen-
tally different positions surrogate mothers occupy in relation to each
other.
The proposed formulation of paretianism is incomplete without a
secondary principle to construct the different state of affairs. Given that
the state of affairs [Cn] does not include subjective mental states, the
secondary principle need focus only on relevant objective facts.145 The
secondary principle holds that an objective, non-mental characteristic
possessed by the disadvantaged party (members of class [B]), that is ex-
ploitable by the advantaged party (members of class [A]), is a relevant
act for determining state of affairs [Cn].
As noted above, a surrogate's lack of education or desperate finan-
143. Although it would not respect individual autonomies in every conceivable case, it is
less likely to be injurious to the autonomy of individuals involved. It also avoids the impracti-
cality associated with the individualistic interpretation of paretianism because it still operates
within the class-based framework, albeit smaller classes.
144. See supra note 135.
145. For example, the fact that one surrogate mother has red hair and another black hair is
not a relevant fact that would dictate that the two women should occupy different states of
affairs [Cn] for purposes of application of the new principle:
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cial need are examples of relevant characteristics.146 Both facts are ob-
jective and non-mental. 47 Under the reformulation of paretianism,
when these are exploited by adopting parents who are wealthier and bet-
ter educated, the resulting contract is unenforceable.
IV. TOWARD A NEW LAW OF CONTRACT FOR SURROGACY
Each of the contract theories discussed requires that the promisor's
commitment be rational. 14 In the case of surrogacy contracts, a surro-
gate mother's decision to terminate before conception her parental rights
is arguably not a rational commitment.' 49
Kronman, for example, argues that "[j]udgment is... best thought
of as the faculty of moral imagination, the capacity to form an imagina-
tive conception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of action
and to anticipate its effects on one's character."'' 0 When deliberating, a
person should form a mental image of the conceivable consequences of
the proposed act.' A deliberating person, however, can only anticipate
the possible consequences of the action if he or she possesses adequate
information concerning the proposed action,5 2 and is able to detach
himself or herself from the immediacy of his or her desires.153
Many surrogate mothers do not possess the information or experi-
ence necessary to form an adequate mental image of their commitment,
nor do they have the ability to suspend their desires during delibera-
tion.' Although many surrogate mothers may already have children,
few can anticipate the emotional trauma associated with relinquishing a
146. Since individual bargaining power could be affected by these characteristics, there at-
taches to them a possibility of coercion.
147. These characteristics reflect the experience of identifiable classes of individuals.
148. See R. POSNER, supra note 46, at 80 ("If someone cannot judge what is in his self-
interest, there is no presumption that the contracts made increase value."); C. FRIED, supra
note 87, at 38 (a promise "must ... have been made rationally, deliberately."); Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 794 (1983) ("[Ihe circumstances...
making the promisor's agreement involuntary is an incapacity of the promisor himself-his
insanity, youth, ignorance or impecuniousness.").
149. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988) (natural mother
never makes a totally voluntary and informed decision).
150. Kronman, supra note 148, at 790.
151. Id.
152. Feinburg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CAN. J. PHIL. 105, 110 (1971). ("One assumes a risk
in a fully voluntary way when one shoulders it while fully informed of all the relevant facts and
contingencies, with one's eyes wide open, so to speak.").
153. Kronman, supra note 148, at 792-93. Kronman argues that if a person is able to neu-
tralize his or her desires, then "[tihe range of alternative interpretations... [the person] is able
to place on his [or her] future conduct ... is increased. Id. at 793.
154. See, e.g., Baby M, 109 N.J. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
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child.155
In addition, many relinquishing mothers feel empty and experience
a loss of self.156 For example, relinquishing mothers have stated that
they "felt like pieces of a person" and they think there is always "a
haunting shadow of sadness" around them.' 57 The anguish and pain as-
sociated with the voluntary relinquishment of a child can last for ex-
tended periods of time.' 58
Many surrogate mothers will not anticipate these emotions, and
consequently, are not able to form an adequate mental image of the com-
mitment or its consequences. In addition, research indicates that women
base their decision about surrogacy on emotional grounds: the enjoy-
ment of being pregnant,' 59 the satisfaction of altruistic feelings,"6 and
the need to resolve feelings associated with a previous lOSS. 16 1 The vivac-
ity of the desires may overcome a woman's ability to anticipate the conse-
155. Id In Baby M, the court stated that:
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows
the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally voluntary, in-
formed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most
important sense, uniformed, and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing
contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000
payment, is less than totally voluntary.
Id.
Many women who have been mothers before are suprised by their reaction to surrogacy.
M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 71. But see Kantrowitz, supra note 37, at 48 (One surrogate re-
ported: "It wasn't my baby. There was no attachment at all. I knew from the beginning that
this was their baby, not mine."). Of surrogate mothers who have experienced a voluntary loss
in the past, most of these women had aborted a fetus as opposed to relinquishment of the baby
through adoption. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Moreover, many women who
voluntarily lost a child through adoption became a surrogate mother to resolve feelings con-
cerning the previous adoption. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Although these
women may be aware of the experience associated with relinquishment, they may not appreci-
ate the possible harm connected with giving up another child.
The adoption process is fundamentally similar to the surrogacy agreement. P. CHESLER,
SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M 116 (1988); M. FIELD, supra note 6, at 85. A
recent study of 334 birth mothers who had relinquished a child for adoption found that several
years later over 60 percent had experienced some form of significant gynecological, medical
and psychiatric problems. P. CHESLER, supra, at 117. Another study found that relinquishing
mothers viewed relinquishment as an "externally enforced decision." Rynearson, supra note
106, at 339. These external factors include the demands of the adopting parents and the desire
to act in the best interests of the child. Id.
156. Miller & Roll, supra note 108, at 416.
157. Id. The authors concluded that "[t]he grieving person's experience of emptiness and
loss of self are exacerbated in these women by the reality of a child having indeed been part of
them physically as well as emotionally." Id.
158. Id. at 412.
159. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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quences of entering a surrogacy agreement and may, therefore, cloud her
judgment. 162 As a result, a woman's decision to enter a surrogacy con-
tract may be characterized as irrational.
One possible resolution to this failure of contract law in the context
of surrogacy may be a legally required "cooling-off" period 163 after the
birth of the child. At the. end of this time period, the restriction is re-
moved, and the agreement may be enforced."6 During the cooling-off
period, however, the surrogate should be able to renounce performance
under the contract without incurring any legal sanction for the breach.
165
This limitation on contracting ability is by no means foreign to con-
tract law. The law applies many types of paternalistic limitations to
promisors -when it presumes that their reasoning ability is impaired.
6 6
Furthermore, a cooling-off provision would be analogous to adoption
statutes.in some states whereby the natural's mother consent can be valid
-only when given after the birth of the child.1 61 Judicial interpretation of
these statutes further provide that within a certain period of time after
birth of the child, consent to adoption is voidable. 168 One court found
that the underlying legislative intent behind its state statute was the de-
sire to preserve the natural mother's right to make an informed choice
because' she is unable to make an informed choice before the cooling-off
period expires. 16 9
Ideally, this cooling-off period allows for reflection which would
"encourage sound judgment and reduce the influences of passion and
whim on the contractual commitments a person makes."' 170 Given that
voluntary agreements require sound judgment and deliberation,"7 ' surro-
162. Kronman, supra note 148, at 793. ("[TIhe pressing immediacy of our desires can para-
lyze our ability to anticipate, in imagination, the moral consequences of our actions.").
163. A cooling-off period is a type of limitation that prohibits enforcement of certain con-
tracts for a period of time. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (5th ed. 1979).
164. Kronman, supra note 148, at 786.
165. Id. At least one other commentator has taken this position. See M. FIELD, supra note
6, at 84-89.
166. Id. The paradigm example of this type of restriction is the legal premise that a con-
tract entered into by a minor or an incompetent is not necessarily valid and legally binding. 2
S. WILLISTON, supra note 118, § 222.
167. See, eg., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107(B) (1989) (allows 72 hour cooling-off pe-
riod); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(c)(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989 & Supp. 1990) (al-
lows 5-day cooling-off period).
168. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky. 1986) (stat-
ute deems consent invalid if given prior to fifth day after birth); Steffen v. Bunker (In re Krue-
ger), 104 Ariz. 26, 30, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (1968) (consent before 72 hours after birth is invalid).
169. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 213.
170. Kronman, supra note 148, at 788-89.
171. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text. As one scholar reasoned, voluntary or
"[c]hosen actions are those that are decided upon by deliberation, and this is a process that
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gate mothers who are unable to exercise sound judgment should be pro-
vided a legal right to rescind the contract during the cooling-off period.
The law should presume that surrogate mothers are not adequately ra-
tional when they enter into the surrogacy contracts.' 72 Surrogate
mothers deserve this special treatment because, like mothers giving up
their child for adoption, they are unable to critically evaluate what their
own desires and interests will be after the child is born. 173 A cooling-off
period imposed after the birth of the child would remedy some of these
problems. Additionally, a cooling-off period is desirable to ensure the
surrogate mother's sound judgment "promotes the welfare of the parties
without significantly diminishing their freedom.""74
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has viewed surrogate mother contracts in the context of
three contract theories of modem law. None of these theories, however,
supports the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.
A surrogate mother's decision to terminate her parental rights can
rarely be made rationally before pregnancy and birth. Few surrogates can
appreciate the negative implications of the post-adoption experience.
Therefore, enforceability of surrogacy contracts imposes an undue hard-
ship on the surrogate mother.
To solve the many problems of enforcing surrogacy contracts, a
cooling-off period, such as those imposed by many state legislatures for
mothers giving up their babies for adoption, is necessary. Such a period
would allow the surrogate mother an opportunity to understand fully the
consequences of her decision to relinquish her parental rights. Further-
more, such a period would ensure that no impermissible advantage-tak-
ing would harm the surrogate mother.
requires time, information, a clear head, and highly developed rational faculties." Feinberg,
supra note 152, at 161 (emphasies added).
172. See Kronman, supra note 148, at 788. ('But there can be little doubt that the rule
barring enforcement of a [child's or incompetent's] contract... works to protect... [them]
from their own shortsightedness and lack of judgment.").
173. See supra note 155.
174. Kromnan, supra note 148, at 794.
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